Dopaminergic signals play a mathematically precise role in reward-related learning, and variations in dopaminergic signaling have been implicated in vulnerability to addiction. Here, we provide a detailed overview of the relationship between theoretical, mathematical, and experimental accounts of phasic dopamine signaling, with implications for the role of learningrelated dopamine signaling in addiction and related disorders. We describe the theoretical and behavioral characteristics of model-free learning based on errors in the prediction of reward, including step-by-step explanations of the underlying equations. We then use recent insights from an animal model that highlights individual variation in learning during a Pavlovian conditioning paradigm to describe overlapping aspects of incentive salience attribution and model-free learning. We argue that this provides a computationally coherent account of some features of addiction.
BACKGROUND
Humans have used alcohol and various kinds of drugs of abuse for thousands of years. The early Egyptians consumed wine and narcotics, and the first documented use of marijuana in China dates back to 2737 B.C. However, the recognition of addiction as a problem occurred relatively recently and developed gradually in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (e.g., see Thomas de Quincey's "Confessions of an Opium Eater," 1821). The emergence of more potent formulations, better methods of delivery (Sulzer, 2011) , and possibly expropriation of mechanisms aimed at internal regulation by drugs of abuse (Müller and Schumann, 2011) likely contributed to this development.
In today's societies, both legal and illicit drugs are readily available and most people experiment with potentially addictive drugs at some point in their lifetime. However, only a relatively small subset is vulnerable to developing addiction. Among those recently starting to use cocaine, for instance, about 5-6% are estimated to become cocaine abusers (O'Brien and Anthony, 2005) . This subset nevertheless is of enormous impact, with addiction thought to affect at least 100 million individuals worldwide (Grant et al., 2004) . Once affected, the consequences are severe, and relapse looms large. The most predictable outcome of a diagnosis of addiction is, unfortunately, not cure but a 90% chance of relapse (DeJong, 1994) . Indeed, addiction represents a major public health concern with great consequences for physical and mental health, work and crime rates, resulting in a significant social and economic burden to society.
Historically, research into addiction has been multifaceted in terms of disease concepts and methods. Early on, addiction was considered primarily a social problem and was treated by legal measures and social institutions. The first criteria for a diagnosis of substance abuse and addiction were included in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for the Classification of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) in 1980. Since then, the DSM has followed an "atheoretical" approach to provide reliable diagnoses for clinical practice, basing their diagnostic criteria for substance use disorders on clusters of clinical symptoms. Criteria include several aspects. One cluster of features centers on impairment of control over drug taking, which includes larger and longer drug use than originally intended, unsuccessful efforts to discontinue use, a great deal of time spent in substance use despite its consequences, and craving. Other clusters concentrate on the social impairments resulting from substance use, the risks drug takers might expose themselves to as a direct consequence of drug effects, and also pharmacological criteria such as tolerance and withdrawal symptoms. With the exception of the type of drug and some pharmacological criteria, these symptom clusters have not been found to be directly associated with specific causes or pathogenetic processes. The newest version of DSM, DSM-5, states that an important characteristic of substance use disorders is an underlying change in brain circuitry that may persist beyond detoxification, particularly in individuals with severe disorders, without identifying what the specific underlying processes or "changes" might be. This chapter focuses on novel theoretical approaches and computational models from machine learning and decision theory in the hope that they might lend new scientific rigor to addiction research (Hasler, 2012; Huys et al., 2011) . One of the beauties of addiction research is that the reinforcing effects of drugs of abuse and the development of drug dependence can be modeled in animals with high validity, and that theoretical frameworks are at a rather advanced stage of development.
Clinical, preclinical, epidemiological, and theoretical findings suggest the importance of learning and neuroplasticity both in the pathogenesis of addiction disorders and in their cure. Specifically, the intake of a substance in larger amounts or over a longer period of time than originally intended and the persistent desire to cut down and regulate substance use may be considered as an expression of a learned involuntary habit and result in reflexive thoughts and actions that contradict an individual's declared goals (Dayan and Niv, 2008; Graybiel, 2008; Redish et al., 2008) . The understanding of learning processes has profited from computational modeling. This has supported the study of how individual variation in various forms of learning might underlie individual variation in the vulnerability to drug addiction. One insight gained from this work is that multiple learning processes occur in parallel and can, at least in part, be captured with so-called model-free and model-based learning theories. The model-based learning system builds an understanding of the world Dayan and Niv, 2008) in terms of what actions lead to what outcomes, akin to learning the rules of a game such as chess. In contrast, model-free learning systems allow behavior in the absence of explanatory understanding. A shift from model-based toward model-free learning may be involved in the transition from occasional drug use to addiction. In the process, behavior may become insensitive to changes in the subject's goals (Dayan and Niv, 2008) . Indeed, maladaptive behaviors are characteristic of individuals with substance use disorders.
Dopamine is thought to play a pivotal role in these learning systems. Phasic dopaminergic signals appear to serve as teaching signals (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997) and be central to the attribution of incentive salience (Flagel et al., 2011b) . The development of substance abuse and addiction likely involves the usurpation of such dopaminergic learning or incentive salience attribution signals (Dayan, 2009; Flagel et al., 2011b; Volkow et al., 2009) . It has also been postulated that the attribution of incentive motivational value (i.e., incentive salience) to reward-associated cues contributes to the psychopathology of addiction. In the present chapter, we review the role of dopamine in learning with a particular focus on its relevance to addiction. Emphasizing the important potential of theory-based and translational research approaches, we hope to illustrate how technological, theoretical, and experimental approaches are bringing us closer to integrating the psychological and neurobiological processes underlying addiction vulnerability and relapse.
OVERVIEW
Section 2 of this chapter reviews the standard reinforcement learning (RL) theory, focusing on so-called model-free and model-based decision-making Sutton and Barto, 1998) . We provide the mathematical foundation of these theories as a basis for subsequent interpretation of behavioral and neurobiological findings. Section 3 of this chapter presents an overview over the evidence linking phasic dopaminergic responses to model-free learning. In Section 4, we describe some important characteristics of these types of learning systems. Model-free learning is suggested to capture important aspects of both habits and incentive salience, while model-based learning is argued to relate to goal-directed valuation, be it instrumentally or in Pavlovian settings. Section 5 begins with a description of individual variability in a Pavlovian conditioning paradigm, whereby animals naturally segregate into those showing sign-tracking behavior, or approach to a conditioned stimulus (CS); versus goal-tracking behavior or approach to the location of impending reward delivery. These findings are interpreted in light of two dominant theories: the RL theory introduced in Sections 2-4, and the incentive salience theory, presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we examine different paths to addiction arising from these data and models, focusing in particular on alterations to phasic signals reflecting terms from learning theory (reward prediction errors, i.e., the difference between expected and experienced reward), and a propensity toward model-free learning and incentive salience attribution.
MODEL-FREE AND MODEL-BASED LEARNING FROM REWARDS
Choosing behaviors that maximize rewards and minimize losses in the longer term is the central problem that RL theory addresses. A difficulty in doing so is the appropriate balancing of short-term gains against long-term losses. Choices made now can have many different consequences tomorrow. The choice to enjoy another drink now may lead to social disinhibition and facilitate friendships or encounters, but it may also impair the ability to fulfill duties at work the next day, with more long-term negative impacts on the ability to maintain a social role. Patients with addiction have major difficulties striking this bargain (Kirby et al., 1999) . RL theory provides one path to identifying adaptive decisions that take both long-and short-term consequences of choices into account. In particular, it addresses the problem that there are many possible futures that need to be considered and appropriately weighted by the probability of materializing. RL theory thus attempts to formalize solutions to problems addicts saliently fail to solve and hence forms a framework for thinking about these problems.
There are at present two fundamentally different classes of neurally plausible approaches to solve the RL problem: model-based and model-free learning. As we will detail below, model-based learning solves the RL problem (i.e., how to maximize rewards and minimize losses in the longer term) by explicitly considering all future consequences of different actions. A typical example would be considering all possible sequences of moves in a game of chess. This is hampered by the huge computational costs it requires (Fig. 1) . Model-free learning solves the RL problem in a more affordable manner, but this benefit comes at a large experiential cost: it suffers from the need for extensive, slow, sampling of the environment. Instead of considering all possible moves hypothetically, the consequences of the moves need to be experienced empirically by the model-free system. Instrumental setting   a1  a3 a1  a4 a2  a5 a3  a2 a1  a4 a2  a4   s1  s2  s3  s4  s5  s6   o1  o3  o2   o1  o3  o2   a1  a2   s2   s0   s5 s7  s1 s2 s8   s1  s0  s2 s5   s1   s0   s2   s3   s4   s5   s6   s7   s8   s9   s10 States in which a1 is available 
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FIGURE 1
Model-based decision-making can be depicted as a decision-tree in both instrumental and Pavlovian settings. (A) In an instrumental setting, model-based decision-making would consider all possible action sequences by evaluating all branches of the tree and determining the best one. The figure shows a specific instance, where the problem consists of first choosing between actions a1 and a2, each of which has three possible outcomes, leading to three different states (s1-s6). In each state, there is then a further choice between two actions, though different states have different available actions. Each of these actions in turn has three further possible outcomes, where the probability of each outcome depends on the state in which the action was taken. Actions are shown as solid circles, with green indicating that action a1 is available, and red that action a2 is available. Empty circles are outcome nodes. In order to choose the optimal sequence of actions, a goal-directed decision-making system has to consider all the options corresponding to all the branches in this decision-tree. In this simple problem, with a sequence of two choices, each leading to three possible outcomes, the tree has width w ¼ 6, depth d ¼ 2, and w d ¼ 36 branches. Thus, the difficulty of the problem is exponential in the length of the action sequence considered. (B and C) Example transition matrices T for actions a1 and a2, respectively. Each column represents the probability distribution over next states when taking that action in a particular state. The larger the gray squares, the greater the probability. These transition matrices thus represent knowledge about action-outcome associations. There are similar matrices that describe when rewards are obtained. (D) In an equivalent Pavlovian setting, model-based decisions would take into account only state transitions. (E) The model would now contain one single transition matrix T describing the probability of going from one state to another, given a particular policy (behavioral strategy).
MODEL-BASED LEARNING
Model-based decision-making involves building a model of the outcomes of actions and using this to infer the best sequence of actions. Consider a simple environment, in which only a few actions are available, each with three different outcomes, and each leading to another set of available actions. The task is to select the best sequence of two actions (Fig. 1A) . In its simplest incarnation, model-based decision-making corresponds to sequentially evaluating all possible action sequences and choosing the best. This demands a so-called model of the world, which in turn consists of two parts. First, a transition matrix T a describes the possible consequences of each action a. In Fig. 1B and C examples are given of how transition matrices describe what actions lead to what outcomes with what probability. Second, it encompasses a reward matrix R that describes the reinforcements for taking an action in a particular state. What is central to this representation is that the causal structure of the environment is captured in the set of all transition matrices T ¼ T a f g for all actions, while the affective values are captured in R and the two are represented separately. For a game, learning T would consist of learning the rules, while learning R would correspond to learning the aims of the game (in chess the capture of the opponent's king). Tree search would then require deriving the optimal play strategy from this information alone, notably without actually needing to experience playing the game Shallice, 1982; Simon and Daw, 2011) .
Learning then corresponds to changing the model of the world, that is, changing either T or R. Learning T can happen in the absence of any rewards (Gläscher et al., 2010) . That animals are able to do this was shown very elegantly in the classic work of Tolman (1948) : animals that were pre-exposed to a maze without food rewards hidden in it were later faster at learning a route to a food reward than those not pre-exposed to the maze (Bouton, 2006) . However, the number of branches in a decision-tree scales as w d where w is the width of one level and d the length of the action sequence. For a game such as chess the width is around 30, and the length of a game up to 40 moves long, rendering simple applications of this approach computationally suicidal. Nevertheless, for small problems, such as determining the fastest way to the nearest coffee shop from your office, it is feasible. Thus, sequential evaluation or tree search consists of acquiring a model of the world and searching this to infer adaptive behaviors. It is resource intensive and limited to rather small decision problems, but it rapidly and efficiently reflects new information as long as the new information can efficiently be used to alter T or R.
MODEL-FREE PREDICTION-ERROR LEARNING
The second approach to maximizing reward relies on iterative updates via modelfree prediction errors. Prediction errors are the difference between what one expects and what one gets. Casually put, imagine you order your favorite pizza at a restaurant (say with gorgonzola and pears) and instead are served a different, less-preferred pizza (say with ham and pineapples). This would constitute a negative prediction error where the eventuality is worse than the anticipation. If, however, the waiter then apologized, brought you a pizza you liked as much as your preferred pizza and threw in two free beers you might experience a positive prediction error, with the outcome being better than your expectation. There would be no prediction error if you got just a pizza that you liked as much as the one you ordered (even if it is not the exact pizza you ordered). These prediction errors, and slightly more complex temporal versions of them, are used by the model-free system to acquire behavior that is provably optimal in certain situations.
To properly understand the features of prediction-error learning, it is worthwhile to consider it formally with a mathematical approach. To simplify the equations, we will consider using this approach to learn how much reward is associated with a stimulus or state s under Pavlovian conditions, but very similar equations describe learning for actions a or indeed state-action pairs (s, a) in instrumental conditioning. As explained earlier, optimal choices consider total future outcomes, not just immediate outcomes. This is formalized by considering the summed future outcomes r t + r t+1 + Á Á Á. Generally, however, the future is uncertain, and future rewards cannot simply be summed up. One must instead consider the average or expected total future reward  r t + r t + 1 + ÁÁÁ ½ . This sum will be denoted as the value V. Different states or situations are associated with different values, and hence we write the total expected future reward when in state s at time t as
The right-hand side of Eq. (1) can now be rewritten slightly differently as a sum of two terms. The first term is just the expected immediate reward  r t js t ½ , while the second term contains the future rewards after the immediate reward, that is, one and more time steps into the future:
The key insight comes from equating the second term with the expected value of the next state s t+1 :
where the second expectation implies a weighting by (and sum over) the transition probability P(s t+1 |s t ) of going from state s t to another state s t+1 . This equation is key, as it tells us how the total future expected reward from state s t (we previously had to evaluate a large tree to obtain this) is related to the total future reward from its successor states s t+1 : the difference should be exactly the expected immediate reward in state s t . This equation, which is one form of the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957; Sutton and Barto, 1998) , thus provides a set of consistency checks between values of different states. It can be used to learn by bootstrapping. Assume we have an incorrect valueV. That means that Eq. (3) does not hold:
and that there is a difference D between the two sides: 
If a is a small (<1), but positive constant, then on consecutive visits the value of state s is always updated a little toward the value it should have, which is the true sum of the immediate reward plus the value of future states. By doing this iteratively to a small extent on each visit t, Eq. (7) implements a running average. We emphasize again that the prediction error measures the inconsistency of the current estimatesV s t + 1 ð Þ andV s t ð Þ with respect to the actually obtained reward r t . Temporal difference (TD) prediction-error learning implies measuring the inconsistency between how expectations change over time (the difference between the terms V s ð Þ and V s 0 ð Þ) and obtained rewards, and summing this up over many repeated experiences. The computations needing to be performed (Eqs. 6 and 7) are now trivial. The work of evaluating the tree of future possibilities (as in model-based decisionmaking) has been shifted to experience rather than simulation based on rules. Hence, model-free prediction-error learning trades computational cost for experiential cost.
A few further points about model-based and model-free learning deserve brief mention:
Knowledge: Unlike the model-based tree search, the model-free Eq. (7) does not require a model of the world in terms of knowledge about action-outcome contingencies. Specifically, in order to learn, neither the transition matrix T , nor the reward matrix R have to be known-there only has to be the possibility of experiencing them. This corresponds merely to acting in the world and observing consequences and rewards.
State Figure 1D and E shows how the decision-tree in panel A can be formulated in terms of states only. That is, it is possible to use a model (T and R) to evaluate the expected reward of performing an action in a state, or the expected reward of being in a state (i.e., collapsing over possible actions).
Instrumental versus Pavlovian: The model-free/model-based distinction is independent of the instrumental/Pavlovian distinction (Table 1) . In instrumental learning, subjects are reinforced for a stimulus-response combination, which is modeled using state-action values Q s, a ð Þ. In Pavlovian conditioning experiments, stimuli are predictive of reward irrespective of the actions emitted by the subjects. These stimulusbound expectations are modeled using state values V s ð Þ. Clearly, the latter begs the question of how and why stimulus values elicit actions at all, and we will return to this below. However, we emphasize both model-based and model-free approaches can, in principle, be applied to either instrumental or Pavlovian scenarios. 
PHASIC DOPAMINE SIGNALS REPRESENT MODEL-FREE PREDICTION ERRORS
The neural bases of model-based learning are not very clear, with only few direct measurements of tree search available ( Johnson and Redish, 2007; Pfeiffer and Foster, 2013; van der Meer and Redish, 2009 ). However, the neural representation of prediction-error signals as required for model-free learning has been examined in exacting detail (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997 ), and we turn to this evidence next. It focuses on the dopamine neurons of the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and, in a nutshell, suggests that dopamine neurons code some form of the d term described earlier. Dopaminergic involvement in reward learning has been studied with recordings of the electrical activity of single neurons, voltammetry (Day et al., 2007) and neuroimaging in rodents, macaques, and humans. In now classical experiments (for reviews, e.g., Daw and Tobler, 2013; Glimcher, 2011; Schultz, 1998 Schultz, , 2013 , dopamine neurons were found to respond with a burst of action potentials (duration and latency of roughly 100 ms) to rewards such as small pieces of food hidden in a box or to drops of cordial delivered through a spout. While rewards typically activate dopamine neurons, punishments inhibit them (Fiorillo, 2013; Fiorillo et al., 2013a,b;  for review, e.g., Ilango et al., 2012 , though see also Brischoux et al., 2009) . When a reward (an unconditioned stimulus US) is repeatedly and consistently signaled by a sound or a visual stimulus (i.e., a conditioned stimulus, CS), the phasic activation no longer occurs at the time when the reward is received, but instead transfers to the onset time of the CS. This parallels how the prediction errors d in the model-free account would behave: initially, the reward is unexpected, and hence leads to a positive prediction error. After learning occurs, the presentation of the CS at unpredictable times leads to positive prediction errors, but the reward itself (which is predicted by the CS and hence no longer surprising) fails to elicit a dopamine response. The response transfer from CS to US parallels the development of conditioned behavior (e.g., conditioned licking with liquid reward) in response to presentation of the CS during learning. Multiple features of dopamine firing align closely with model-free accounts. The phasic activation in response to CSs is independent of the sensory modality of the conditioned stimuli and increases with predicted reward magnitude (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Roesch et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2005 ) and probability (Enomoto et al., 2011; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Morris et al., 2006; Nakahara et al., 2004; Satoh et al., 2003) . This is again in line with the theoretical formulation as the expected value increases with the size of the reward and its probability. Furthermore, the longer the delay between the CS and the reward, the weaker the response (Fiorillo et al., 2008; Kobayashi and Schultz, 2008; Roesch et al., 2007) , reflecting temporal discounting of future rewards. Finally, if a reward-predicting stimulus is itself preceded by another, earlier, stimulus, then the phasic activation of dopamine neurons transfers back to this earlier stimulus (Schultz et al., 1993) , which is again captured by the above theoretical account (Montague et al., 1996) of model-free learning.
The relation to model-free learning is further illustrated by the finding that dopamine neurons not responding to reward predicted by conditioned stimuli nevertheless respond when reward occurs at unpredicted time points, for example, outside the task or earlier than predicted (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998) . Both of these situations constitute positive prediction errors and would be captured by a d > 0. Moreover, when reward is predicted but fails to occur (e.g., because it is withheld by the experimenter or because of an error of the animal), there is a negative error in the prediction of reward (d < 0). Dopamine neurons duly show a phasic depression in activity (Schultz et al., 1997; Tobler et al., 2003) and the duration of depressions increases with the size of the negative prediction error (Bayer et al., 2007; Mileykovskiy and Morales, 2011) . Taken together, dopamine neurons seem to emit a model-free prediction-error signal d such that they are phasically more active than baseline when things are better than predicted (positive prediction error), less active than baseline when things are worse than predicted (negative prediction error), and show no change in activity when things are as good as predicted (no prediction error). In other words, the firing of dopamine neurons is well described by formal model-free approaches to RL (Eqs. 6 and 7), suggesting that the dopaminergic signal not only corresponds to an error in reward prediction, but that it can also be used as a signal indicating precisely how much and in what direction expectations need to be changed-a teaching signal (Sutton and Barto, 1998) .
The activation elicited by the earliest reward-predicting stimulus can also be interpreted in terms of prediction-error coding because the sudden occurrence of a reward-predicting stimulus constitutes a positive prediction error with respect to the preceding intertrial interval, during which no reward was predicted. In most experiments, the probability of reward at each moment in time is low due to relatively long and variable intertrial intervals. Reward-predicting stimuli induce positive prediction errors relative to that low background probability. Thus, dopamine neurons appear to code errors in the prediction of reward at each moment in time as captured by Eq. (6). For instance, when a stimulus predicting reward at 25% is followed by either a stimulus predicting reward at 100% (positive prediction error) or another stimulus predicting 0% (negative prediction error), the second stimulus activates or depresses dopamine neurons, respectively . This finding further reinforces the notion that stimulus-induced activation of dopamine neurons strongly covaries with prediction errors.
Many studies have confirmed, quantified, and extended reward prediction error coding by dopamine neurons, even in humans (Zaghloul et al., 2009 ). The dopamine neurons of monkeys that have not learned to predict reward show continued positive and negative prediction errors at the time of reward or reward omission, respectively. By contrast, the dopamine neurons of monkeys that have learned to predict reward well show CS responses indicative of learning in an asymmetrically rewarded saccade task . In behavioral situations with contingencies changing about every 100 trials, dopamine neurons code the difference between current reward and reward history weighted by the last six to seven trials (Bayer et al., 2007) . The occurrence of reward or reward prediction (positive prediction error) or their omission (negative prediction error) activates or depresses dopamine neurons in an inverse monotonic function of probability, such that the more unpredicted the event the stronger the response (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011; Enomoto et al., 2011; Fiorillo et al., 2003; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009; Morris et al., 2006; Nakahara et al., 2004; Nomoto et al., 2010; Oyama et al., 2010; Satoh et al., 2003) . Enomoto et al. (2011) attempted to directly address whether the phasic dopamine response reflects the total future reward, as opposed to just the immediate reward. Monkeys first had to identify the currently reinforced target out of three possible targets by trial and error. They then received two or three further rewards for returning to that target. Equation (4) suggests that the predicted sum of future reward increases and decreases again as the monkeys progress through these exploration and exploitation trials. The suggestion is based on the expected value over the course of the trials and on the notion that later rewards are less valuable than sooner rewards. Both conditioned licking and phasic dopamine responses to the start cue of a trial closely follow the pattern suggested by the notion that they reflect time-resolved prediction errors not only about immediate rewards but, critically, the sum of immediate and future rewards, just as suggested by Eq. (5). These data demonstrate that dopamine neurons compute the prediction-error term with respect to a quantitative and timeresolved expected total future reward term  V s t + 1 js t ð Þ ½ . Enomoto et al. (2011) examined Pavlovian values in the setting of an instrumental task (cf. Guitart-Masip et al., 2012) . It is also possible to examine whether the phasic responses depend on what action was chosen, as should be the case in model-free instrumental acquisition of state-action Q MF s, a ð Þ values. Indeed, dopamine neurons do show such a sensitivity (Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007) , and thus appear to be able to emit model-free prediction errors both when learning about stimulus values V MF s ð Þ as in Pavlovian settings, and when learning about stimulus-action values Q MF s, a ð Þ as in instrumental settings. Cyclic voltammetry has shown that dopamine release in the striatum, the main target region of dopamine neurons, follows many of the same features as the prediction-error signals of dopamine neurons themselves (Day et al., 2007) . In humans, functional MRI (fMRI) studies have reported correlates of prediction-error signals in the striatum that resemble those of dopamine neurons recorded in animals, including phasic (event-related) positive and negative prediction-error responses (D'Ardenne et al., 2008; McClure et al., 2003a; O'Doherty et al., 2003) that reflect probability (e.g., Abler et al., 2006; Burke et al., 2010; Spicer et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2007) and more specific predictions of formal learning theories Kahnt et al., 2012; Rutledge et al., 2010; Tobler et al., 2007) . However, it is worth keeping in mind that the hemodynamic response measured with neuroimaging is nonspecific rather than a one-to-one reflection of a particular neural event such as dopamine release (see also Düzel et al., 2009 ), which could explain why some fMRI studies have suggested positive coding of losses (Seymour et al., 2004 ; although see also Tom et al., 2007) and a dominance of action over value (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012) .
CAUSAL ROLE OF (DOPAMINE-MEDIATED) PREDICTION ERRORS IN LEARNING
So far, we have argued that prediction errors play a role in model-free learning and that dopamine neurons emit a signal that closely resembles this formal prediction error. However, this falls short of showing that these prediction errors are indeed necessary for and causally involved in learning in vivo. One possibility of testing whether prediction errors are important for learning is to set up a behavioral situation in which two different stimuli are equally often paired with reward but only one of them is followed by a prediction error. This is exactly what the so-called blocking paradigm achieves (Kamin, 1969) . In this paradigm, one new stimulus (denoted by the letter "X" in the top row of Table 2 ) is added to a previously learned stimulus ("A") whereas another new stimulus ("Y") is added to a neutral stimulus ("B"). Both compounds are followed by reward. After the compound with the pretrained stimulus ("AX") the reward occurs just as predicted by the pretrained stimulus (no prediction error) whereas after the compound with the neutral stimulus ("BY") the reward is unpredicted (positive prediction error). If prediction errors are important for learning, there should be no learning about the new stimulus "X" in the former case but there should be learning about the new stimulus "Y" in the latter case. Figure 2A shows that, in agreement with these predictions, monkeys show considerably less conditioned licking to stimuli that were not followed by a prediction error than to control stimuli that were followed by a reward prediction error (Waelti et al., 2001) . Dopamine neurons show the same pattern ( Fig. 2A, bottom) : they respond to stimuli that were followed by a prediction error but not to those that were not (Waelti et al., 2001 ). Thus, prediction errors are required for stimulus-induced phasic activity of dopamine neurons.
What remains is the question whether prediction error-like phasic dopamine responses are causally involved in reward learning? Recent evidence suggests they are. In an optogenetic variant of the blocking paradigm just described, dopamine neurons of rats were artificially activated at the time of the reward already predicted by the pretrained stimulus ( Fig. 2B, bottom; i.e., stimulation occurred in AX trials, cf. second row of Table 2 ). If the prediction-error hypothesis of dopamine firing is correct, this should induce an artificial prediction error at a time when no prediction error would have occurred naturally. As a result, this prediction error should lead to learning about the stimulus added to the pretrained stimulus. Indeed, rats in which this kind of stimulation was active showed stronger conditioned responding to the added Learning to a stimulus, for example, X is "blocked" by the presence of another stimulus A that already predicts the outcome. Stimuli are denoted by letters. The original blocking experiment (Kamin, 1969) used an aversive between-subjects design; by contrast, the experiment described in the text and depicted in abbreviated form here (Waelti et al., 2001 ) used an appetitive within-subject design where the test consists of a comparison between Y and X (see also Fig. 2A) ; The optogenetic unblocking experiment of Steinberg et al. (2013) used a between-subject design. Here the test consisted of a comparison in the conditioned behavior in response to presentation of X in three groups. In one group of rats the dopamine neurons were stimulated at the time of the reward in AX trials, while in the other groups the stimulation occurred at other times or not at all. In transreinforcer blocking (Dickinson and Dearing, 1979) and identity unblocking (McDannald et al., 2011) , the reinforcer is changed at the AX compound stage. The test here consists of a comparison of behavior in response to X after this change versus when no change has occurred (i.e., standard blocking). A question mark ? indicates stimulus to which the animals' response is measured in the test. 
FIGURE 2
Dopamine neurons show blocking that parallels behavioral blocking. Learning is reinstated and blocking prevented when dopamine neurons are stimulated at the time of a predicted reward. (A) Schematic of blocking task used with single neuron recordings from dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area (VTA) (within-subject design). In a first pretraining phase, a stimulus is paired with a drop of liquid reward (top left) whereas a control stimulus is not (top right). Accordingly, the animal forms an association between the left stimulus and reward but not between the right stimulus and reward. In a second pretraining phase, additional stimuli are occasionally presented together with the stimuli previously learned in the first pretraining phase. In this phase, both compounds are followed by reward. The reward elicits a prediction error in the control compound on the right but not in the experimental compound on the left. This is because the added stimulus is followed by unpredicted reward in the control but not in the experimental case. Because there is no prediction error, learning to the added stimulus on the left does not occur. In a third phase, the added stimuli are occasionally tested on their own (interspersed with the four trial types used during the pretraining phases in order to maintain learning). The blocked stimulus (left) and its control (right) are both followed by no reward and the behavior (conditioned licking, top) as well as the responses of a single dopamine neuron at the time of the stimulus (bottom) is shown. Control but not blocked stimuli elicit conditioned licking and phasic dopamine activations. Note that hemodynamic responses in the striatum show a very similar response pattern (Tobler et al., 2006) . (B) Schematic of blocking task used with optogenetic stimulation (between-subject design). Pretraining phases proceeded similarly to the recording study, except that the nature of stimuli differed and in the second pretraining phase there were no reminders from the first pretraining phase. During the second phase, two groups received active stimulation of dopamine neurons concurrently with reward (PairedCre+) or during the intertrial interval (UnpairedCre+). A third group received inactive stimulation at the time of the reward (PairedCreÀ). The data are shown in the bar plot at the bottom as time spent in the reward port during stimulus presentation. The group with active stimulation at the time of the reward showed more Pavlovian approach behavior than the other two groups, presumably due to the additional prediction-error signal elicited by optogenetically induced phasic dopamine activity. cue on the first test trial than rats in which active stimulation was delivered during the intertrial interval or rats in which the appropriately timed stimulation was not active (Steinberg et al., 2013) . Moreover, stimulation of dopamine neurons at the usual time of reward slowed behavioral extinction (Steinberg et al., 2013) . Thus, the stimulation counteracted the negative prediction error induced by the absence of expected reward and thereby conditioned behavior was sustained. These findings clearly show that dopamine is causally involved in reward learning. They also support and extend previous optogenetic studies that implicated dopamine in learning by showing that dopamine neurons code reward prediction errors (Cohen et al., 2012) , and that their activation is sufficient to reinforce intracranial self-stimulation (Kim et al., 2012; Rossi et al., 2013; Witten et al., 2011) and leads to conditioned place preference (Tsai et al., 2009 ) whereas inhibiting them causes avoidance learning (Tan et al., 2012) .
PHASIC DOPAMINE SIGNALS IN MODEL-BASED LEARNING
The data discussed up to this point are in line with dopamine coding model-free, experiential prediction errors. However, to some degree, dopamine responses incorporate information not available in current experiences into their prediction-error responses. Consider a task in which the values of two stimuli are anticorrelated such that when one reverses from being rewarded to being unrewarded, the other automatically does the opposite (Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010) . On the very first trial after realizing that the value of one stimulus has changed, a monkey can infer that the value of the other stimulus has also changed without having to experience the outcome of that stimulus (though note that this depends on representing the two stimuli separately). Both behavior and dopamine neurons process inferred outcome values, although the impact of experienced value on both is more pronounced. In particular, dopamine neurons respond more strongly to a stimulus that is inferred to be valuable than to a stimulus that is inferred to be nonvaluable. In a different task (Nakahara et al., 2004) as the number of unrewarded trials increases, the probability of reward increases. Instead of showing extinction, monkeys learn the structure of such a task and dopamine neurons track the probability of reward. These findings are consistent with dopamine neurons also playing some role in forms of model-based learning. We will return to this possibility below in the context of goal-tracking behavior.
BEHAVIORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MODEL-FREE AND MODEL-BASED CHOICES
Above we have seen that phasic dopamine signals covary with a TD prediction error. Henceforth, we will consider these signals as model-free. Model-free learning evaluates the total future reward by summing up the prediction errors over time into either V MF s ð Þ or Q MF s, a ð Þ values. We briefly review several domains in which this has qualitative behavioral consequences that distinguish model-free from modelbased choices.
OUTCOME IDENTITY
Model-free values V MF s ð Þ and Q MF s, a ð Þ are nothing but the sum of past prediction errors. The error does not contain any information other than the discrepancy in the amount of reward obtained. Thus, V MF s ð Þ and Q MF s, a ð Þ values arising from model-free learning do not contain any other information, such as the identity of the reward. Model-free learning should thus be sensitive only to the size or valence of a reward, but not to its identity. This distinguishes it from the model-based system. In an aversive version of the blocking experiment (Table 2 , top row; Kamin, 1969) , a stimulus A is first trained to predict shock. When a second stimulus, X, is added and the compound followed by shock, the ability of stimulus X to predict shock is reduced, even though it was paired with the shock, too. This provides behavioral evidence for the importance of prediction errors in learning. In a variant of the original blocking paradigm (transreinforcer blocking; Table 2 , third row; Dickinson and Dearing, 1979; Ganesan and Pearce, 1988) , the identity of the reinforcer is changed in the compound phase, for example, from reward omission to shock presence. Strikingly, when A predicts the absence of reward, learning of the association between X and shock is blocked. This strongly suggests that "reward" and "punishment" are motivational opponents on a linear scale, and that in at least some types of learning the only aspect of the nature of the affective outcome (food reward or shock punishment) that is relevant is its value on that linear scale, and that other features are abstracted away.
However, animals are not entirely insensitive to the nature of Pavlovian outcomes and this can be revealed in other blocking experiments. In identity unblocking (Table 2 , bottom row), the equivalence of two reward identities (e.g., pellets and sucrose drops) is first assessed. A first CS is then conditioned to predict the first reward identity. Then, an identity shift occurs: the compound predicts the new reward, which was measured to be of equal value. Thus, there is no value prediction error (Eq. 7), yet animals are sensitive to such shifts (Bouton, 2006; Jones et al., 2012; McDannald et al., 2011; Seligman, 1970; Takahashi et al., 2011) , showing that they do represent and learn more features about the outcome than the scalar measure of how rewarding it is. Thus, while transreinforcer blocking (and value blocking more generally) supports model-free processes, identity unblocking can be taken as evidence for model-based processes in Pavlovian conditioning (McDannald et al., 2011) .
PAVLOVIAN APPROACH AND CONSUMMATORY BEHAVIORS
Model-free Pavlovian state values V MF s ð Þ do not contain explicit information about particular actions. They can nevertheless drive some simple behaviors, particularly when there is some distance between the organism and a positively valued stimulus. Pavlovian approach behaviors primarily involve locomotion to bring the organism closer to the appetitive stimulus, irrespective of what appetitive stimulus is being approached. There is no need for this approach behavior to be informed by anything other than the positive value of the to-be-approached stimulus, and thus a combination of a simple proximity reduction mechanism with V MF s ð Þ is sufficient to account for approach. Similar arguments can be made for at least some speciesspecific aversive responses (Seligman, 1970) .
However, the bare model-free value V MF s ð Þ alone cannot account for what to do with the appetitive stimulus, that is, for consummatory behaviors. A positive V MF s ð Þ indicates that reward is expected, but not whether it will require chewing (for a pellet), licking (for water), or copulation (for a sexually receptive conspecific). In order to produce such consummatory behavior the model-free value must modulate, or somehow be informed by, a system that has access to the relationship between responses and outcomes or stimuli (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967) . Note that such learned consummatory responses can be elicited in parallel with the simpler approach behavior. As action-outcome representations are central to the notion of model-based systems, it is likely that consummatory responses, and indeed the transfer of consummatory responses to stimuli (Davey and Cleland, 1982) arises from a modulation of a (possibly evolutionarily restricted) model-based system by modelfree values akin to Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) (see below). There is in fact evidence for a neural dissociation between approach and consummatory Pavlovian responses, with a certain alignment with model-based and model-free circuits (Yin et al., 2008) , although the interaction between these is not clear. However, not all putatively consummatory responses adaptively reflect actions that are adapted to the US (Hearst and Jenkins, 1974) .
INSTRUMENTAL BEHAVIOR
Despite not containing information about actions, model-free Pavlovian values V MF s ð Þ can drive the acquisition of instrumental behaviors via multiple paths. The acquisition of V MF s ð Þ is based on bootstrapping, iteratively updating estimates of the value to fit with the sum of the current reward and the value of the next state. In this process, the cached value V MF s ð Þ comes to replace the summed future rewards. More specifically, changes in state values V MF s ð Þ imply changes in future reward, and so a change in value induced by an action is a metric that can be used to reinforce behaviors. This forms the core of the actor-critic model (Barto et al., 1983; O'Doherty et al., 2004) . Experimentally, it is perhaps most directly demonstrated by conditioned reinforcement experiments (Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Meyer et al., 2012) , where instrumental behaviors can be reinforced by Pavlovian CSs.
Model-free values also can have other influences on model-based instrumental behavior. Determination of model-based values Q MB s, a ð Þ often require too much computational power to be feasible, as we emphasized earlier. One powerful approach is to mix model-based and model-free evaluations, and this has been successfully used in building computers that beat world chess masters (Campbell et al., 2002) . Returning to Fig. 1A , such an approach would correspond to replacing the subtree below a particular node with that node's model-free value. This thus forms a second path by which model-free Pavlovian state values can drive instrumental behavior, and indeed by which model-free can drive model-based choices. Although such a subtree substitution is yet to be demonstrated experimentally, it is likely that drug-seeking involves such a process: here, highly complex, circumspect and flexible behaviors facilitate approach to a drug (a tree search up to a particular node in the tree); but the negative consequences of taking the drug are not respected (the tree below the node is not evaluated).
PAVLOVIAN-INSTRUMENTAL TRANSFER (PIT)
Both model-free V MF s ð Þ and model-based V MB s ð Þ Pavlovian values can influence instrumental behavior. This is demonstrated in two types of PIT, general and outcomespecific PIT. In both types of PIT, appetitive CSs enhance and aversive CSs suppress instrumental behaviors for other outcomes Estes and Skinner, 1941; Holmes et al., 2010; Huys et al., 2011; Lovibond, 1983; Niv et al., 2007; Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Talmi et al., 2008) . In general PIT, a stimulus that has been paired in a Pavlovian manner with one type of outcome (e.g., water) increases instrumental lever pressing for another type of outcome (e.g., pellets). The specific nature of the expected reward is not relevant, only its value. Hence, the information that is present in V MF s ð Þ values may be sufficient for this. In contrast, in outcome-specific PIT, a CS associated with pellets promotes an instrumental action reinforced by pellets over and above another instrumental action that was reinforced by sucrose (Corbit and Balleine, 2005) . This does require representation of the actual outcome, not just the value. Thus, while general PIT requires only the information carried by V MF s ð Þ, outcome-specific PIT requires additional information and likely relies on V MB s ð Þ from model-based processes (Corbit and Balleine, 2005; Holmes et al., 2010; McDannald et al., 2011; Prévost et al., 2012 Prévost et al., , 2013 Schoenbaum et al., 2009 ).
MOTIVATIONAL SHIFTS
The temporal integration of prediction errors has one further important consequence: it instantiates a slow, running average over experience. This means that model-free systems will not immediately reflect changes in motivation. Model-based systems on the other hand will. Motivational shifts have been used to highlight model-based components in both Pavlovian and instrumental scenarios. We recall that prediction-error signals have been found not only in Pavlovian, but also in instrumental scenarios (Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007) .
First, consider instrumental devaluation experiments. An animal is first trained to perform a response, say press a lever, for a reward. The reward is then devalued, for instance by giving the animal free access to it followed by administration of a nauseainducing drug. When given another opportunity to consume it, the animal will refuse to do so. If the animal has had extensive experience with the behavior, then it will initially continue to press the lever despite refusing to consume the food. This habitual behavior is said to be under stimulus-response control and not under the control of a representation of the outcome Balleine, 1994, 2002) . In other words, the information reflected in the habitual behavior is present in a stimulusaction value Q MF s, a ð Þ, which captures how valuable an action is in a particular state, but without providing any information about the actual outcomes. An insensitivity to motivational changes is characteristic of cached values and habitual choices McClure et al., 2003b; Valentin et al., 2007; Wunderlich et al., 2012a) . Thus, instrumental learning derived from the accumulation of dopaminergic prediction errors accounts for outcome-insensitive habits.
After less extensive instrumental training, animals are sensitive to devaluation, and a reduction of behavior can be observed on the very first trial after devaluation Balleine, 1994, 2002) , suggesting that a prospective representation of the outcome of the action is used to guide action choice. Similar findings hold in closely related paradigms in humans de Wit et al., 2009; Tricomi et al., 2009; Valentin et al., 2007) . The shift from early devaluation sensitivity to later devaluation insensitivity can be explained by the statistical properties of model-based and model-free systems, respectively. The model-free system has comparatively poor accuracy when little data is available, but this improves with experience Keramati et al., 2011) . Motivational shifts appear to have less effects on actions proximal to the goal Killcross and Coutureau, 2003) , where the burden on tree search is low. One complication to this account is the requirement for incentive learning in certain situations. Animals trained hungry may not change their behavior when tested thirsty unless they have experienced the outcomes in those particular motivational states. This suggests a certain inaccessibility of internal states to the model-based system, at least in instrumental settings, or may relate to the need for learning the reward matrix R.
Motivational shifts can also be used to demonstrate model-based components in Pavlovian conditioning (Dayan and Berridge, 2013; McDannald et al., 2011) . A striking example was recently provided by Robinson and Berridge (2013) , where animals were first trained to associate a CS with aversive Dead Sea salty water, such that presentations of the CS readily induced aversive responses. Strikingly, after rendering the animals hungry for salt, they immediately started approaching the CS. Thus, a motivational shift succeeded in rendering a previously aversive stimulus appetitive. Clearly, the rapid approach after the motivational shift cannot be accounted for by a cached stimulus value-this would require multiple iterations of sampling the salt water in the salt-hungry state before the new positive prediction errors could update the stimulus value sufficiently to make it attractive. Instead, this experiment suggests that the animals learned the identity of the outcome associated with the stimulus, and in the novel salt-hungry state were able to use this to infer the new value of the stimulus given the new value of the outcome it predicted (Dayan and Berridge, 2013; Jones et al., 2012; Schoenbaum et al., 2009 ).
UNLEARNING
Finally, in the model-free Eq. (7) the entire past reward history is contained in V MF s ð Þ. No other aspect of the past history is maintained, and the past values are forgotten as soon as a change occurs. Say, for instance, a CS has V MF s ð Þ ¼ 4, predicting four pellets, but then is updated (via a prediction error) to V MF s ð Þ ¼ 5. The latter is the only representation maintained; there is no memory of the fact that the CS used to predict less pellets in the past. Hence, any learning to reflect new information equivalently implies forgetting or unlearning past information (Bouton, 2004; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) . Although slow changes can indeed lead to unlearning, sudden shifts in the predictive validity of a stimulus (extinction learning) do not lead to unlearning but rather to the learning of novel associations (Bouton, 2004) . Such novel associations correspond to the learning of new latent causes for observations (Courville et al., 2004 (Courville et al., , 2005 Gershman et al., 2010) . Unlike unlearning, these fit more easily in a model-based than a model-free framework.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY
We have now reviewed model-based and model-free learning, the role of dopamine in model-free learning, and behavioral and neurobiological characteristics of both systems. Recent findings have highlighted substantial individual variability in how and what subjects learn in standard Pavlovian conditioning paradigms. This has consequences for learning accounts of addiction as some learning tendencies appear to confer vulnerability toward developing addiction. In this part, we first present the data on individual differences in Pavlovian responding in some detail (mainly reiterating the findings of Flagel et al., 2011b) , then discuss its interpretation in terms of incentive salience (Berridge, 2004 (Berridge, , 2007 Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Saunders and Robinson, 2012) , and finally put forth a hypothesis that proposes a connection between the propensity to assign incentive salience and the propensity to employ model-free learning (Dayan and Berridge, 2013; Huys et al., 2013b; Lesaint et al., 2014; McClure et al., 2003a) .
SIGN-TRACKING AND GOAL-TRACKING
Behavior
When rats are exposed to a CS, such as a lever, that is repeatedly paired in a Pavlovian fashion with an US, such as food reward, there is substantial individual variability in the conditioned response that emerges (see Fig. 3 ). Some animals, referred to as "sign-trackers" (STs) will approach and oftentimes interact with the CS upon its presentation ( Fig. 3A ; Hearst and Jenkins, 1974) . Others, termed "goal-trackers" (GTs) approach the location of reward delivery upon CS presentation ( Fig. 3D ; Boakes, 1977) . Remarkably, these conditioned responses develop even though reward delivery is not contingent on any response, that is, in a classical Pavlovian conditioning paradigm. Furthermore, all rats learn the CS-US association, the resulting conditioned responses emerge at similar speeds, and both STs and GTs retrieve all of the food pellets that are delivered. Hence, the topography of the emitted response differs, but both sets of animals learn the CS-US association equally well and at similar speed.
Dopamine Signals During Acquisition
These individual differences in conditioned responding have shed light on the role of dopamine in stimulus-reward learning. Flagel et al. (2011b) used fast-scan cyclic voltammetry in the core of the nucleus accumbens to characterize cue-induced phasic dopamine signaling during Pavlovian training in selectively bred rats predisposed toward sign-or goal-tracking behavior. Similar to outbred rats, these selectively bred 
FIGURE 3
Sign-tracking and goal-tracking by animals exposed to classical conditioning, whereby a CS (in the figure a lever on the right) predicts delivery of a food US at a different location (in the food box on the left). Note that this is a Pavlovian conditioning procedure, and thus the rat obtains the food irrespective of its behavior, and does not need to press the lever. (A) Sign-tracking rats come to approach the lever-CS during CS presentation, while (D) goal-tracking rats approach the location where the food US will be delivered. (B and E) Phasic dopamine signals in the nucleus accumbens core. In sign-trackers, the phasic response to the CS increases, while that to the US decreases, as is predicted by the temporal prediction-error hypothesis. In goal-trackers, phasic dopamine responses to CS and US do not change over time. (C and F) show how the peak dopamine responses change over trials. These differences suggest that sign-trackers acquire a cached value V MF s ð Þ in accordance with the temporal prediction hypothesis, but that goal-trackers do not.
Data in B, C, E, and F adapted from Flagel et al. (2011b) .
phenotypes both learned a conditioned response and did so at the same rate. Further, the lever-CS was more attractive and more desirable for the selectively bred STs, as indicated by approach behavior and the ability of the lever-CS to serve as a conditioned reinforcer. Remarkably, only for STs did the lever-CS evoke an increase in dopamine release. That is, only for STs did the phasic dopamine response shift from the presentation of the food reward-US to the lever-CS across training. The CS did evoke dopamine release in GTs, but this did not change over trials. The same pattern of results was also found in outbred rats characterized as STs or GTs, suggesting that these neurochemical signatures are specific to the conditioned responses and not an artifact of the selective breeding.
Next, Flagel et al. (2011b) asked whether the development of either goal-or sign-tracking responses was dependent on dopamine. They administered the nonspecific dopamine antagonist flupenthixol systemically prior to the first of several Pavlovian training sessions. The selectively bred animals were ideal for this experiment, as the predictability of the phenotypes allowed the authors to assess the effects of the drug on the acquisition of the conditioned responses. Interestingly, administration of the dopamine antagonist attenuated the performance of both sign-and goal-tracking behavior. However, when taken off of the drug, the GTs exhibited a fully developed conditioned response, similar to control animals, whereas the STs remained deficient in their responding even during the drug-free test session. Thus, dopamine was necessary for learning the CS-US association in STs, but not in GTs. Similarly, Parker et al. (2010) reported that mice with disrupted dopamine signaling were fully capable of learning a goal-tracking conditioned response, despite the fact that there was no transfer in dopamine signaling from the US to the CS. Thus, phasic dopamine signals are critical for learning the CS-US relationship that leads to a sign-tracking conditioned response, but not for those that lead to a goal-tracking conditioned response. Flagel et al. (2011b) also examined the effects of flupenthixol on the expression of sign-and goal-tracking behavior after the conditioned responses were acquired. They found that systemic dopamine antagonism attenuated the expression of both. To more directly assess the role of dopamine in the performance of these conditioned behaviors, and to minimize nonspecific effects of the drug on behavior, Saunders and Robinson (2012) administered flupenthixol directly into the core of the nucleus accumbens after outbred rats had acquired stable sign-or goal-tracking behavior. This dose-dependently attenuated sign-tracking behavior, with little to no effect on goal-tracking behavior (see also Di Ciano et al., 2001; Parkinson et al., 2002) . Importantly, sign-tracking behavior was fully impaired upon the first CS-US presentation following administration of flupenthixol into the accumbens. Thus, the drug effects were evident before new learning could occur, and changes in dopamine levels were able to alter the motivational value of reward cues, without the need to re-experience the CS-US association (Berridge, 2012; Dayan and Berridge, 2013; Richard et al., 2013; Robinson and Berridge, 2013) . Furthermore, the effects of dopamine antagonism were specific to the Pavlovian conditioned approach behavior and did not affect the conditioned orienting response in the STs .
Dopamine Signals After Acquisition
INCENTIVE SALIENCE ACCOUNTS OF THE SIGN-TRACKING/GOAL-TRACKING VARIABILITY
Attribution of incentive salience is the process by which neutral stimuli are transformed into attractive and "wanted" incentive stimuli via Pavlovian learning mechanisms (Berridge, 1996; Berridge and Robinson, 2003) . Extensive research has shown that Pavlovian stimuli that have been attributed incentive salience have three fundamental properties (Berridge, 2012) : (1) they are attractive and elicit approach toward them, (2) they are themselves desirable and can reinforce the learning of new actions (i.e., act as conditional reinforcers), and (3) they can elicit a conditioned motivational state that energizes ongoing instrumental actions (i.e., general PIT; Cardinal et al. (2002); Everitt et al. (2001) ; Milton and Everitt (2010) ). These three features are dissociable, but rely on partially overlapping neural mechanisms . Note that incentive salience in this context is distinct from incentive motivational properties or "incentive value" in instrumental settings as defined by Dickinson and colleagues (Dickinson and Balleine, 1994; Dickinson et al., 2000) .
Behavior
The incentive salience account of sign-tracking/goal-tracking describes the difference between the two groups, arguing that CSs are imbued with incentive salience by STs, but not by GTs. Both STs and GTs learn that the lever-CS precedes and predicts the delivery of the US in that the lever-CS comes to elicit a response in both phenotypes, and respective responses emerge at a comparable rate. As they emit their response similarly, and this response has the same relationship to the predicted US (i.e., it is noncontingent), both phenotypes are equally able to assign "predictive" value the CS. However, only for STs does the lever-CS attain the additional incentive motivational properties mentioned earlier. Hence, the assignment of incentive salience is seen as the central component that distinguishes STs and GTs. The ability of the CS to predict the occurrence of the US is considered to be common to both groups.
For STs, the CS attains at least two of the fundamental properties of an incentive stimulus (i.e., of a stimulus that has acquired incentive salience) ). First, STs (unlike GTs) approach the CS upon its presentation, and the cue is attractive to them. Second, STs exert more instrumental effort than GTs for presentation of the CS in the absence of food reward. Thus, the cue acts as a more powerful conditioned reinforcer for STs than for GTs (Lomanowska et al., 2011; Meyer et al., 2012; Robinson and Flagel, 2009) . Evidence demonstrating individual variation in the third fundamental property of an incentive stimulus, i.e., general PIT, is lacking, perhaps due to the complex nature of the paradigm. Taken together, these findings support the notion that for STs, but not GTs, the lever-CS is attributed with incentive salience. Salience attribution theories hence consider the assignment of incentive value to be the central component that distinguishes STs from GTs.
Dopamine
In the incentive salience framework, dopamine is specifically involved in assigning Pavlovian incentive value in STs. This relies on a tight link between the three key features of incentive salience reviewed earlier, and dopamine. First, the shift in phasic responses from the US to the CS is present in STs but not in GTs (Flagel et al., 2011b) . As both groups learn the association between CS and US, but differ in terms of the gradual attribution of incentive salience, this suggests that phasic dopamine is relevant not to learning to predict the US from the CS per se, but to assigning incentive salience to the CS. Second, nonselective dopamine antagonism affects learning of a sign-tracking response, but it does not affect learning of a goaltracking conditioned response (Flagel et al., 2011b) . This complements the findings demonstrating a selective shift in phasic responding in STs, but not GTs, and argues that (1) dopamine is necessary for the assignment of incentive salience and (2) dopamine is not involved in the assignment of the predictive properties that are also seen in GTs. Third are the results from injections of dopamine antagonists into the nucleus accumbens core after completion of learning. These have immediate effects, before any new learning can occur. This suggests a role for dopamine in incentive salience that goes beyond that of learning. Furthermore, the fact that orienting responses were unaffected (in both STs and GTs) suggests that even in STs, dopamine was not abolishing all of the qualities of the CS but only its incentive salience properties (i.e., its ability to elicit approach). Finally, dopamine antagonism abolished the conditioned response in STs only , which again argues for a role that is selectively associated with incentive salience processes. Hence, it appears clear that dopamine has an involvement in incentive salience that is independent of and goes beyond its involvement in learning, and that some aspects of learning the CS-US associations remain intact in the absence of dopamine, not only in GTs, but in STs, too.
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ACCOUNTS OF THE SIGN-TRACKING/ GOAL-TRACKING VARIABILITY
We now consider the hypothesis that model-free and model-based learning may at least partially map onto sign-and goal-tracking behavior, respectively (Huys et al., 2013b; Lesaint et al., 2014) . In Pavlovian conditioning experiments, reward delivery is independent of the animals' behavior. Hence, only stimulus, but not stimulusaction values, are constrained. RL accounts match incentive salience accounts in terms of arguing that dopamine is relevant for STs but not GTs, but differ in a number of important details.
Behavior
Section 4 detailed the characteristics of behavior that model-free values can and cannot support. The suggestion that incentive salience, and hence sign-tracking, is driven by V MF s ð Þ values hinges on arguing that model-free values V MF s ð Þ are sufficient to account for the three fundamental properties of incentive salience (see Section 4), and that the behavior shown by STs does not require access to information that cannot be contained in V MF s ð Þ. This is because V MF s ð Þ values are devoid of anything but the size of the expected reward. On their own, they can only influence behavior as a "pure" reward would because they represent no other information. Specifically, we make reference to the three key components of incentive salience mentioned in Section 5.2. First, model-free values can drive Pavlovian approach responses (Section 4.2). As such, they capture the key feature that differentiates STs from GTs. Second, V MF s ð Þ values can reinforce actions in the way that conditioned reinforcers are formalized in the actor-critic models (Section 4.3). This captures the notion that stimuli assigned incentive salience can become conditioned reinforcers. Third, they can influence ongoing behavior arising in other systems by altering the opportunity costs (Section 5.3.3). This captures the ability of stimuli with incentive salience to influence other behavior in general PIT experiments. However, these different features of incentive salience are known to have only partially overlapping neurobiological substrates. Similarly, for model-free values to lead to these features, they would have to interact with other systems (e.g., with instrumental systems both for conditioned reinforcement and PIT), and hence again only have partially overlapping neurobiological substrates. Nevertheless, V MF s ð Þ values appear sufficient to account for the main features of sign-tracking behavior and incentive salience (see also Dayan and Berridge, 2013; McClure et al., 2003b) .
Dopamine Signals During Acquisition
The parallel between model-free systems and sign-tracking is strengthened by the role of dopamine. Both STs and GTs show phasic DA responses in the NAcc core to both CS and US onsets ( Fig. 3B and E, red traces) . In the STs this signal changes slowly over time, increasing in response to the CS and decreasing in response to the US (Fig. 3B , blue trace and C). As extensively reviewed in Section 3, this is what would be expected if the prediction error was based on the slow, iterative, accumulation of a cached value V MF s ð Þ. In STs, interfering with these dopamine signals by injecting a nonselective dopamine antagonist during training prevents any learning (Flagel et al., 2011b; Parker et al., 2010) , which is in keeping with results on other Pavlovian behaviors such as autoshaping (Di Ciano et al., 2001; Parkinson et al., 2002) and mirrors the findings that phasic dopamine signals can have a causal role in Pavlovian learning (Steinberg et al., 2013) . It suggests, thus, that STs need a phasic dopaminergic prediction-error signal in order to learn because their learning is heavily biased toward learning through incremental acquisition of model-free values V MF s ð Þ. The fact that the signals are observed in the NAcc core also maps onto the notion that these signals might be modelfree because, as discussed earlier, model-free mechanisms suffice for general PIT, which is dependent on the core, but not for specific PIT, which is more dependent on the shell (Section 4.4; Corbit and Balleine, 2011 ; though see Shiflett and Balleine, 2010; Robinson and Berridge, 2013) . Finally, the reliance on model-free learning can, at least in part, explain the core incentive salience features.
Dopamine Signals After Acquisition
The results by Saunders and Robinson (2012) clearly suggest that the role of dopamine is not limited to representing phasic error signals for learning, but extends to the expression of behavior once learning has stabilized (see also Shiner et al., 2012) . One likely and important issue is that Saunders and Robinson (2012) manipulated not only phasic but also tonic dopamine signals. Indeed, the most prominent effects of manipulations of dopamine are not alterations in learning, but profound changes in the rate and vigor at which behavior is emitted (Salamone et al., 2009 ). The RL framework reviewed earlier does not account for this, but semi-Markov, average RL formulations do (Niv et al., 2007 ). These consider not only which action to emit, but also when and how vigorously. They achieve this via an extra term, the average reinforcement, which functions as an opportunity cost (i.e., as a measure of reward forfeited on average by inaction). Examinations of the impact of this term on behavior suggested a close link with tonic dopamine (Niv et al., 2007) . This could potentially explain the impact of dopamine antagonists on the expression of both sign-and goaltracking behavior during learning (Flagel et al., 2011b ; see also Beierholm et al., 2013; Mazzoni et al., 2007) .
The results of Saunders and Robinson (2012) however show that after learning the impact of dopamine antagonists is confined to STs. Interpreted in the RL framework, this suggests that the opportunity cost might be preferentially mediated via tonic dopamine in those animals that rely on model-free learning whereas the timing and vigor of model-based choices might be more directly linked to the anticipated outcome, and hence less sensitive to such tonic dopaminergic mechanisms. Indeed, interference with DA by pharmacological means or by VTA inactivation both abolish the ability of Pavlovian CSs to motivate approach and produce PIT (Lex and Hauber, 2008; Murschall and Hauber, 2006; Wassum et al., 2011) , and DA stimulation promotes it (Wyvell and Berridge, 2000) . By contrast, model-based behavior is often rather more resilient to DA manipulations (e.g., Wassum et al., 2011; though see Guitart-Masip et al., 2013; Wunderlich et al., 2012b) . Thus, the admittedly very speculative suggestion is that tonic levels of dopamine in the NAcc core differentially modulate the expression of model-free values, and thereby selectively affect STs.
Goal-Trackers
The RL account of goal-tracking behavior is less crisp, both theoretically and in terms of its mapping onto neurobiological substrates. As pointed out earlier, GTs clearly make predictions about the occurrence of rewards as they are perfectly able to approach the goal-box upon presentation of the CS. As explained in the previous section, predictions of reward associated with stimuli can be derived not only from model-free (V MF s ð Þ), but also from model-based (V MB s ð Þ) learning. Indeed, that is the very raison d'eˆtre for both, and so the fact that both sets of animals make predictions is not informative about which mechanism they learn by. More to the point, V MF s ð Þ values are sufficient to produce both the "predictive" and "incentive" learning. However, the fact that the CS is itself less attractive and supports less conditioned reinforcement in GTs suggests that it has not acquired features of a reward itself (as model-free values do), but rather helps the rat explicitly predict that a particular event (a reward, in this case) will happen in the future. Model-based learning of T might consist in learning to predict that the event "CS" is followed by the event "pellet delivery" (i.e., the statistical rules of the environment), while the structure R would separately be used to represent the desirability of that event. There is evidence that signals involved in acquiring T are differentiable from reward prediction-error signals (Gläscher et al., 2010) . Thus, when seeing the CS, a model-based learner in the autoshaping experiment might be reminded specifically of the food pellet, and base its action choice on its current desires; and the learning of this type of prediction appears not to depend on dopaminergic prediction errors. The CS would be a purely "informational" stimulus, not attractive in its own right (Flagel et al., 2011a) . This account makes a very straightforward and easily tested prediction, namely, that food devaluation should abolish goal-tracking, but leave sign-tracking unchanged. This is at least partially consistent with reports whereby highly deprived animals (at 75% of optimal body weight) show stronger goal-directed behavior than animals that are less deprived (at 90% body weight; Boakes, 1977) . However, this is certainly also consistent with effects motivation could have via goal-directed mechanisms, and indeed may be complicated by issues related to incentive learning.
The argument that GTs are more goal-directed implies the involvement of goaldirected neural structures (Killcross and Coutureau, 2003; O'Doherty et al., 2004; Yin et al., 2004 Yin et al., , 2005 . In agreement, GTs do seem to recruit cortical "top-down" regulation of their response to reward cues (Flagel et al., 2011a ). This, however, then raises the question about the nature of the phasic dopamine signals in the GTs. There clearly are phasic DA responses to both CS and US in the GTs, but these stay constant without showing any signs of adaptation (Fig. 3F) . Areas thought to be involved in model-based Pavlovian estimation of values are known to influence phasic dopamine signals (Takahashi et al., 2011) . However, as the size of the signals does not change, it suggests that the prediction term used in their computation must remain at zero, and hence that the prediction errors are not iteratively collated into a model-free value. Why would this be? There are several potential answers. It might be that the model-free system learns only "online," that is, only when it is in charge itself (Sutton and Barto, 1998) . That this might be neurobiologically plausible is suggested by the fact that habitual control of behavior is itself under constant control of the prefrontal cortex, specifically the infralimbic cortex (Smith and Graybiel, 2013; Smith et al., 2012) . It might also be that the dopamine transient signals the need to change one's beliefs (i.e., that learning is necessary), but is not a teaching signal itself (i.e., does not indicate what should be learned; see also Section 3.2). However, it is unclear why this signal would then continue to persist in animals after behavior has reached a stable asymptote. A somewhat different explanation focuses on the detailed temporal structure of events, which differs between GTs and STs. GTs focus on the goal as soon as the sign appears, but they also focus on the goal during the ITI (a time when the sign is not present) when no food is presented there. This may lead to keeping the model-free values of both the goal and the CS near zero (though ITI head-entries into the food-cup do not differ between GTs and STs; see Lesaint et al., 2014 for a detailed discussion).
In summary, RL accounts might suggest that the "predictive" learning seen in GTs is not dopamine dependent and relies on building a model of the structure of the environment. Conversely, it would suggest that the assignment of "salience" is evidence for relying on model-free learning via dopaminergic mechanisms.
ADDICTION
Addiction is a disorder with profound deficits in decision-making. Most addictive drugs have rapid effects and impact the dopaminergic system either directly or indirectly (Koob, 1992; Olds, 1956; Tsai et al., 2009) . Several features of addiction are at least partially amenable to explanations within the overall framework outlined earlier. We will briefly consider partial accounts of addiction based on (a) drug-induced alterations to phasic dopaminergic signals and (b) individual (and drug-induced) variation in the tendency to rely on model-free learning and assign incentive salience (Dayan, 2009; Flagel et al., 2011b; Huys et al., 2013b; Redish, 2004; Redish et al., 2008) .
PHASIC DOPAMINERGIC SIGNALS IN ADDICTION
If drugs of abuse alter or directly elicit phasic dopamine release (Boileau et al., 2003 (Boileau et al., , 2007 Cox et al., 2009) , they could elicit artificial prediction errors which in turn would lead to enhanced learning of stimuli that predict their occurrence (Dayan, 2009; Redish, 2004) . Indeed, L-Dopa enhances striatal prediction errors and learning whereas haloperidol reduces them (Pessiglione et al., 2006 though see also Knutson and Gibbs, 2007) . If drugs of abuse mimic dopamine prediction-error signals, resulting in an irreducible, constant prediction error even in the absence of reward, then this would lead to a neverending increase of the associated state V MF s ð Þ or state-action Q MF s, a ð Þvalues, which would lead to strongly determined behavior that would be hard to overcome. Blocking paradigms (Kamin, 1969; Steinberg et al., 2013; Waelti et al., 2001) provide one formal test of this prediction: new stimuli added to pretrained stimuli should be learned more if the reward used is a drug of abuse than if it is a natural reward (Redish, 2004) . Administration of D-amphetamine into the nucleus accumbens enhances blocking in an aversive paradigm, whereas administration of dopamine antagonists reduces blocking (Iordanova et al., 2006) . The prediction has also been tested explicitly for nicotine (though the results are, to our knowledge, only present in abstract form; Jaffe et al., 2010) and for cocaine (Panlilio et al., 2007) . While in the former case they have been at least partially confirmed, by way of individual variation (highly nicotine responsive animals show no blocking for nicotine whereas animals more responsive to water do show blocking for water), the latter case failed to confirm this prediction. As pointed out by Dayan (2009) , alternative forms of RL that rely on actor-critic learning may allow for correct values (and hence blocking) despite a constant increment to prediction errors, and an effect directly on the advantage of actions could lead to more rapid development of deeply embedded actions, again with correct values.
Addiction is characterized by a profound and long-lasting downregulation of dopamine D 2 receptors in the striatum (Heinz et al., 1996 Huys et al., 2013b; Volkow et al., 2009) , which is also characteristic of animal models of obesity ( Johnson and Kenny, 2010) . This downregulation may be a consequence of drug taking, but it may also predispose to the development of addiction and to relapse (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Heinz et al., 2005; Morgan et al., 2002; Thanos et al., 2001; Volkow et al., 2002 Volkow et al., , 2009 . Dopamine D 2 receptors are both pre-and postsynaptically located. It is not clear whether the reduction seen in addiction is mainly preor postsynaptic, but both could potentially promote drug taking. Postsynaptically, they have been shown to mediate the effect of losses on "go/no-go" learning (Dreyer et al., 2010; Frank, 2005; Frank et al., 2004; Kravitz et al., 2012) and could thereby contribute to the insensitivity toward adverse consequences in addiction (Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004; Kravitz et al., 2012; Maia and Frank, 2011; Vanderschuren and Everitt, 2004) . Presynaptically, they are involved in an autoinhibitory negative feedback loop which could particularly affect go-learning as it could reduce the positive phasic transients (Bello et al., 2011) and thereby lead to the sort of increased prediction error mentioned earlier (Bello et al., 2011; see also Sulzer, 2011) . Furthermore, drug craving is correlated with the reduction in D 2 receptors . It is conceivable that reductions in presynaptic D 2 receptors might also affect tonic dopamine signals (Martinez et al., 2005 (Martinez et al., , 2009 and that this relates to the effects of dopamine and cached values on PIT (Murschall and Hauber, 2006; Wyvell and Berridge, 2000) and signtracking . There is also evidence that the link between dopamine synthesis and phasic prediction errors is altered by addiction, and this might be mediated by a failure of the presynaptic D 2 control Schlagenhauf et al., 2013) . Moreover, Flagel et al. (2010 Flagel et al. ( , 2014 have shown that selectively bred rats with a predisposition toward sign-tracking behavior and addiction have lower levels of D 2 mRNA in the nucleus accumbens and dorsal striatum, but not in the VTA. However, these addiction-prone rats also exhibit a greater proportion of striatal "D 2 -high" receptors, the functionally active state of the dopamine D 2 receptor.
Thus, there is substantial theoretical and biological plausibility supporting the notion that drugs of abuse interfere directly with phasic dopaminergic signals, and that this contributes to the establishment and possibly to the maintenance of addicted behavior. It has to be noted that it is unclear, as yet, whether changes in dopamine signaling are a cause or consequence of drug abuse; although some of the animal literature suggests it may be a predisposing factor (e.g., Dalley and Everitt, 2009; Flagel et al., 2010 Flagel et al., , 2014 . Direct tests of this hypothesis have at present provided only equivocal evidence but these findings may be in part confounded by variability in the innate tendency of individuals to rely on model-free learning and assign incentive salience.
INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY IN ADDICTION VULNERABILITY
As discussed earlier, there is growing evidence that the natural tendency to sign-track is both highly variable (Meyer et al., 2012 ) and a risk factor predisposing to addiction (Saunders and Robinson, 2010; Saunders et al., 2013a,b) . That is, individual variation in cue reactivity is associated with individual differences in vulnerability to addiction. Rats that sign-track to cues associated with food reward also sign-track to drug-associated cues (Flagel et al., 2010) , and drug cues maintain drug selfadministration and reinstate drug-seeking behavior to a greater extent in STs than GTs, even in the face of adverse consequences Robinson, 2011, 2012; Saunders et al., 2013a) . Furthermore, STs also express other traits related to addiction liability. They are, for instance, more impulsive than GTs (Flagel et al., 2010; Lovic et al., 2011; Tomie et al., 1998) and more likely to seek novel environments (Beckmann et al., 2011) . Finally, differences in the dopamine system have been associated with individual variation on all of these traits (Dalley and Roiser, 2012; Flagel et al., 2009 ). As we have argued that sign-tracking reflects incentive salience and model-free processes, this further motivates the suggestion that variations in the extent to which individuals rely on model-free learning processes form a risk factor for addiction.
Likewise, there is considerable individual variation in the ability of drug cues to bias attention, elicit craving, and instigate relapse in humans (Carter and Tiffany, 1999; de Wit et al., 1986) . Emerging evidence suggests that some humans may be more "cue reactive" than others. For example, Mahler and de Wit (2010) reported that individuals with the highest craving in response to food cues, when hungry, were the same individuals that showed the highest craving in response to smoking cues during abstinence. These findings are reminiscent of the sign-tracking rats that attribute excessive incentive motivational value to both food-and drug-paired cues (Flagel et al., 2011b; Robinson, 2011, 2012) and lend credence to the notion that variation in this trait may underlie susceptibility to addiction in humans.
Just as in animals, this variation may be related to the dopaminergic system (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Dalley and Roiser, 2012) . Leyton et al. (2002) showed that even in healthy subjects the variability in dopamine response to amphetamine relates to subjective ratings of "wanting. " Franken et al. (2004) showed that the dopamine receptor antagonist haloperidol can reduce attentional bias to drug cues among addicts, and Ersche et al. (2010) showed that the effect of such dopaminergic manipulations (both agonistic and antagonistic) varies with compulsivity. The effect of haloperidol in the former and amisulpiride in the latter, both rather selective D 2 antagonists, is surprising given the drug-induced reductions in D 2 receptors (see above). However, the directionality of the effect is consistent with the procompulsive and pro-addictive effects of D 2 agonists in Parkinson's disease and may relate to specific effects in the ventral compared to the dorsal striatum (Dagher and Robbins, 2009; Evans et al., 2006) .
Although we have focused on evidence from Pavlovian learning (particularly sign-tracking), the reliance on and shift toward model-free learning is also apparent in instrumental learning, with addictive drugs shifting responding from modelbased toward model-free responding, speeding up habitization and likely predisposing toward addiction. When rats acquire instrumental responses for alcohol they become insensitive to devaluation earlier than when the outcome is pellets . Along the same lines, amphetamine pretreatment speeds up the rate at which the outcome insensitivity develops (Nelson and Killcross, 2006) , and this depends particularly on D 1 rather than D 2 receptors (Nelson and Killcross, 2013) . In humans, there is evidence for enhanced habitization in obsessivecompulsive disorder (Everitt and Robbins, 2005; Gillan et al., 2011 Gillan et al., , 2014 Robbins et al., 2012) and forthcoming evidence in cocaine addiction (N. Daw and V. Voon, personal communication), but not yet in alcohol addiction (Sebold et al., in press ).
Both innate variability in attributing incentive salience and relying on model-free learning, and more direct effects on dopaminergic signals predict that drugassociated cues should have increased model-free value in addicts. This in turn means that sudden, unexpected presentation of such cues should elicit greater dopaminergic transients. PET studies measuring released dopamine with raclopride displacement (Boileau et al., 2007; Kalivas and Volkow, 2005; Volkow et al., 2006) and fMRI studies measuring responses to drug-associated cues Grüsser et al., 2004; Wrase et al., 2007) both clearly support this prediction (though see Wilson et al., 2004 for a discussion of how these relate to craving).
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the impact of past experience on present learning (Huys et al., submitted for publication). A stimulus that elicits approach will be more attended to, and hence may be more easily learned about and associated with reinforcements at the expense of other stimuli present in the environment. More generally, online iterative RL in which behavior (and hence sampling of the environment) changes after every experience often does not have the kind of optimality guarantees that offline learning has (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996) , and may lead to selfreinforcing loops of choice and reward (Hogarth et al., 2007) . One such effect was shown directly by Freeman et al. (2012) , who have found that abstinent smokers were more likely to associate a drug cue with reward than a nondrug cue. Indeed, attentional mechanisms are clearly important in learning (Dayan et al., 2000; Pearce, 1997) and possibly in the maintenance of addiction (Hogarth and Chase, 2011; Hogarth et al., 2013; Wiers et al., 2011) .
SHIFTS TOWARD MODEL-FREE LEARNING IN ADDICTION
We have so far mainly focused on contributions by the model-free system. However, alterations to the model-based systems are likely to be equally important and open alternative paths to addiction. As reviewed earlier, extinction does not lead to unlearning, but rather to the re-engagement of prefrontal cortices and novel learning (Bouton, 2004; Gershman et al., 2010) . The underlying associations continue to be present and can re-emerge, either spontaneously or in response to a cue. Interestingly, context-induced reinstatement is more prominent in GTs than in STs (Saunders and Robinson, 2013) . Moreover, a context paired with ethanol injections can immediately and profoundly impair the ability to exert goal-directed control (Ostlund et al., 2010) , and optogenetic suppression or activation of the prelimbic cortex, which is thought to involve goal-directed computations, can abolish or re-establish sensitivity to punishments (Chen et al., 2013) . There is also preliminary evidence for this in humans (Sebold et al., in press ). Addiction, therefore, might impair the normal re-engagement of model-based decision-making in the face of aversive events or events associated with drugs . The former may account for the perseverance of behavioral response patterns in the face of adverse consequences, a hallmark of addiction (Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004; Gelder et al., 2006; Vanderschuren and Everitt, 2004) .
In a landmark study, Killcross and Coutureau (2003) showed that lesions of the pre-and infralimbic rodent cortices abolished goal-directed and habitual behavior, respectively. This showed that model-free and model-based systems co-exist in the brain, but that behavioral expression tends to be dominated by one or the other. Behavioral and imaging evidence for this also exists in humans . This immediately raises the question of arbitration: how is dominance determined? There are two prominent explanations. Daw et al. (2005) argued from a Bayesian perspective that it would be optimal to use all knowledge when making choices, but that various types of knowledge should be weighted by their certainty. Using detailed analyses of the noise characteristics of model-based and model-free systems, they argued that model-based systems are more data efficient, and hence make more accurate predictions, when little evidence exists and uncertainty is high, that is, early on in training. The opposite is true after extensive evidence later in training. An alternative account (Keramati et al., 2011; Pezzulo et al., 2013 ) is based on the value of information (VOI; Russell and Wefald, 1991) . Unlike the Bayesian account, this explicitly takes the cost of computation into account. Briefly, if the expected improvement in performance outweighs the cost of computation, then it is worth engaging in model-based reasoning. Because of a similar argument about the increasing accuracy of model-free values with experience as used by Daw et al. (2005) , this improvement is worthwhile early on in training, but not later on. However, the VOI account is fundamentally different, in that it suggests that expression of habits is under continuous evaluation and control by the prefrontal cortex, which is consistent with some recent evidence (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Smith and Graybiel, 2013; Smith et al., 2012) .
Both of these models provide multiple avenues for a shift from goal-directed to habitual behavior. Both the VOI and the uncertainty-based account would increase the prominence of the model-free systems as a consequence of increased noise in the model-based system. In the former case, the increase in information that would occur from engaging the model-based system would be reduced. This could occur due to a general cognitive impairment (D. Schad, M. Rapp, and Q. Huys, unpublished observations) , perhaps due to deficits in prefrontal function, especially as a result of exposure to neurotoxic substances such as alcohol or cocaine (Briand et al., 2008; Goldstein et al., 2004; Lucantonio et al., 2012) ; but may also be characteristic of other populations (e.g., Darke et al., 2000) , and involves the prefrontal cortex (Goldstein et al., 2004 ; see also Volkow et al., 2009 ). In support, Takahashi et al. (2011) have recently shown that cocaine interferes with the ability of the orbitofrontal cortex to establish a detailed state space (Walton et al., 2010) , which would lead to less accurate models and hence less accurate predictions. In the VOI account, increased cost of computation would have very similar effects, and cognitive impairments could be involved in the effect of stress (Schwabe and Wolf, 2009 ) and certainly the effect of dual tasks (Otto et al., 2013) .
It is important, though, to bear in mind that although habits share features with compulsions (Gillan et al., 2011 (Gillan et al., , 2014 , they are not one and the same (Dayan, 2009; Robbins et al., 2012; and many others) . It has been suggested that after extended training, habits become deeply engrained by shifting further dorsally in the corticostriatal loops (Belin and Everitt, 2008; Willuhn et al., 2012) . Using cyclic voltammetry and a behavioral paradigm similar to sign-tracking paradigm, Clark et al. (2013) examined changes in dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens core during the acquisition and maintenance of a Pavlovian conditioned approach response (i.e., sign-tracking). In agreement with the results of Flagel et al. (2011b) , it was shown that both contact with the lever-CS and CS-evoked dopamine release increased over time for rats that sign-tracked. However, after prolonged training (i.e., around 150 CS-US trials), these two measures were no longer correlated. That is, sign-tracking behavior continued at asymptotic levels, but CS-evoked dopamine release diminished with extended training. Moreover, the effects of a dopamine D 1 receptor antagonist on sign-tracking behavior were less prominent following postasymptotic training. However, the data on punishment sensitivity (Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004; Vanderschuren and Everitt, 2004 ) and the importance of prefrontal mechanisms in the reassertion of control (Chen et al., 2013; Ostlund and Balleine, 2008; Sebold et al., in press) may also speak to the difference between habits and compulsions.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have suggested that the combination of a theoretical framework with findings of individual differences in the dopaminergic system during Pavlovian conditioning may explain why some individuals become addicted whereas others do not. RL models (Montague et al., 1996) give a powerful and deep account of the behavioral correlates of prediction-error learning. Following McClure et al. (2003b) , we have explained that this type of learning leads to representations in terms of model-free values, and that these capture key features of individual processing of motivational value, incentive salience assignment, and sign-tracking. As such, it provides a framework within which neurobiology and behavior relevant to addiction can be related in a computationally coherent manner (Dayan, 2009; Huys et al., 2013a; Redish et al., 2008) , and forms one example of the application of computational neuroscience to psychiatric problems (Maia and Frank, 2011; Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., submitted for publication; Hasler, 2012; Montague et al., 2012) .
However, much remains to be done. While the description of model-free learning and the neurobiological details of the circuits computing prediction errors advance rapidly, our understanding of the representations and computations underlying model-based reasoning remains poorly defined. However, it is clear that addictions, and indeed many other affective psychiatric disorders, involve similar mechanisms.
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